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Is the spirit of civility dying in America? Many people
think so. They say that our public discourse has become
intemperate and mean; that tolerance and generosity are now
rare in political debate; that the process of lawmaking is
increasingly dominated by a ruthless partisanship whose
expressions are barely distinguishable from physical violence;
that candidates today ignore their opponents' ideas and attack
their personalities instead, with ad hominem arguments of the
cruelest and least charitable kind; that our whole public life
has become degraded and harsh. The symptoms of this, they
say, are visible wherever we look: in the venomous provoca-
tions of radio talk show hosts; in the lewd curiosities of the
tabloid press; in the personal assaults that today pass for
campaign advertising; in the sarcasm and anger of political
argument generally. Even the President (who is of course
hardly a disinterested party) has complained about the
growing incivility of American politics, and blamed the
increasing violence of our words for the real acts of terror
which, he says, our discourse anticipates and produces.
The President is right. There has been a loss of civility in
America, but not in the way or for the reasons he implies. If
we equate civility, as many people do, with decorum, with
temperateness of speech, with politeness and a high-minded
determination not to descend from principles to personalities,
then the current period of American politics must be judged
about as civil as any other, which is to say, about as civil as an
energetic and heterogeneous democracy like ours can ever
attain, or ought even to view as ideal. Our politicians have
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always assaulted each other's characters and insulted each
other's ideas. There has always been a tabloid press, specializ-
ing in tales of greed and sex. Even our most respectable
papers have generally treated politics as a sport, with few or no
holds barred. We have always been an uncivil people, fascinat-
ed by the prurient detail, appreciative of a well-aimed insult,
inclined to put candor before politeness and accustomed to a
violence of speech that has often foreshadowed violence in
fact. In all these respects, we are today no different than we
have ever been in the past.
Indeed, there is some reason to think that, so far as
rudeness and vulgarity are concerned, the situation has
actually improved. Even our most vicious political cartoonists,
for example, do not compare with their predecessors in the
last century, who exploited every ethnic and religious preju-
dice available to skewer their targets. Even the most lurid
accounts of Bill Clinton's sex life seem timid by comparison
with the pornographic stories the French revolutionaries
published about Marie Antoinette. And even the angriest
political quarrel no longer ends in a duel, a real if decorous
form of violence unimaginable today.
But rudeness and vulgarity are not susceptible of close
measurement, and judgments about their rise or fall must
always be subject to doubt. We have to accept the possibility,
therefore, that our public life has indeed become harsher and
less polite, as the President and others claim. Still, even if this
is so, it is not a cause for unqualified regret, since rudeness
has its uses too, at least in our political culture. We are a
democratic people, unaccustomed to deference and the forms
of genteel respect, and our rough ways of talking help to keep
us all, and our leaders especially, on a humbling plane. If we
equate civility with politeness, therefore, the claim that we
have lost a virtue we once possessed seems dubious as a matter
of fact, and it is hard to justify the moral concern this claim is
meant to arouse. So long as we identify civility with politeness
in public debate, there is little reason to believe that we are
now experiencing anything like a crisis of civility in American
life. Whether they mean to or not, those who draw this
equation thus lend support to the apostles of complacency
who are forever reassuring us that there is nothing new or
disturbing about our present situation. But there is a crisis of
civility in America today, though we cannot begin to under-
stand its scope and character until we abandon the popular
HeinOnline -- 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 729 1995-1996
1996] DISTINGUISHED LECTURER SER1ES-KRONMAN 729
but shallow equation of civility with politeness and recall its
original meaning instead.
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) gives "politeness" as a
secondary meaning of the word "civility," but its root sense,
according to the OED, is "the art of civil government": a direct
translation of the Latin word civilitas, which itself, as the OED
points out, translates an older Greek word, politike-the skill of
participating in the affairs of a polis, or city. We can start by
noting something obvious about this art: that, like other arts,
it is not a power human beings possess by nature and need no
education or discipline to acquire. The ability to breathe is a
natural power the exercise of which does not require con-
~cious cultivation. Every art, by contrast, demands both
experience and training, and civility is no exception. The art
of civil government requires, in fact, a great deal of experi-
ence-more than many other arts, like that of calculation, for
example-which is why Aristotle believed there can be
prodigies in mathematics but none in political affairs. (Of
course, Aristotle also believed that man is by nature a "political
animal,"1 and hence that the cultivation of civility is for
human beings the fulfillment of a natural destiny-making
man the only earthly creature whose nature is realized
through art, through the conscious application of intelligence
or mind to its own given vital powers.)
A cook prepares food; a poet makes poems; an architect
designs buildings. Each of these activities has its own charac-
teristic product and each its special art-the art of produci~g
the product in question. By analogy we might say that citizens
make government-the whole assemblage of laws, customs,
~xecutive decisions, adjudications, and the like that constitute
what Aristotle called the politeia,2 or constitution, of a commu-
nity-and that civility is the art of making these things. Like
the cook's art and the poet's, the citizen's art calls for discrimi-
nating judgments of many sorts: judgments, for example,
about which laws are best, and how they ought to be applied.
These judgments are often quite complex, and require
extensive knowledge, well-developed perceptual powers, and
a keen moral sense, not unlike the judgments that other
important human activities require. The exercise of political
judgment is, moreover, a pleasure in its own right, an immedi-
I ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, 1253a2.
2 [d. at 1278blO.
HeinOnline -- 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 730 1995-1996
730 CUMBERLAND LA W REVIEW [Vol. 26:727
ate source of satisfaction to the person who possesses it (like
the arts of poetry and cooking), and its development requires
that the would-be practitioner of the citizen's art first learn to
take an interest in its product, in the good that it produces,
just as practitioners of poetry and cooking must start by
learning to take an interest in poems and food. In this respect,
the art of civil government displays the same circular psycholo-
gy as other arts, depending for its initial development on the
arousal of an interest that the exercise of the developed art
rewards. In the case of civility, this is an interest in govern-
ment or, as we say, in the res publica, in public things. This
interest is both the foundation of the art of civil government
and its target or goal, at once its source and object. The
interest that forms the basis of civility, in this double sense, is
an interest in what eighteenth century writers called the public
good: the public-spirited desire to advance the good of the
laws that the citizen's art produces.
These are propositions basic to the republican tradition of
thought that has its beginnings in Aristotle's political philoso-
phy and whose teachings played a crucial if limited role in the
creation of the American system of government. But however
clear these axioms may seem, they are all subject to doubt,
and in particular the last, the postulation of an interest in the
public good as the foundation of the citizen's art. Those who
followed Aristotle in the republican tradition assumed the
existence of such an interest and sought to explain it by
contrast with another, the interest that everyone takes in his
or her own private welfare. Sometimes we favor a law, they
said, because we think it will make us richer or safer or
enhance our individual prestige. And sometimes we favor a law
because we believe it to be best for our community, all things
considered, even if it makes us poorer or less secure or
deprives us of some previously-held honor. In the first case,
ourjudgment is based upon calculations of self-interest, but in
the second upon an interest in the public good. Judgments of
the second sort imply a willingness to subordinate or sacrifice
our private welfare to that of the community as a whole, and
only when we form our judgments on this basis are we
practicing the art of civil government, as classical republican-
ism conceived it. To be sure, our judgments are often mixed,
combining elements of public-spiritedness and self-interest in
different proportions. But the distinction between these has
always seemed clear to republican thinkers, and fundamental
to the meaning of civility itself.
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The clarity of this distinction has been challenged,
however, on at least two separate grounds. First, it is now often
said that appeals to the public interest are always and only
disguised efforts to advance the private good of the person
making the appeal. The modem "masters"3 of suspicion (Paul
Ricoeur's well-chosen phrase) have taught us to regard the
seemingly selfless judgments of those who claim to have only
their community'S welfare at heart as a subtle ideological trick
designed to advance the interests of their economic class; or
as deference to a superego created to shield themselves from
the world; or as the expression of a slave morality that
empowers the weak by enabling them to advance their selfish
interests under color of a false concern for others. Our
intellectual culture has been deeply shaped by these ideas.
Today when we hear someone invoke the public good, our
first reaction is often to ask what private interest this masks,
and to search for the real motive of the statement, below the
surface of expression, in some other and more self-centered
concern. The depths having been revealed to us, we now find
it more difficult to take the surface seriously, to credit at face
value the claim that one is acting for the sake of the public
good and not out of private interest instead. Suspicious as we
are, this claim has become for us quite literally incredible, and
we cannot keep ourselves from asking what selfish subterra-
nean purpose it conceals (which is very different from
accepting the bona fides of the claim but disagreeing with the
conception of the public good it states).
A second line of attack on the classical distinction between
private interest and public good stresses the fact-for that is
what we now take it to be-that every political judgment, like
every aesthetic and (in the view of many) every moral judg-
ment too, is always offered from a specific point of view or, as
we are now accustomed to saying, from a particular perspec-
tive. If ours is an age of suspicion, it is also the age of the
perspective-the age, as Heidegger called it, of the weltan-
schaungor "world-picture.,,4 We have grown accustomed to the
idea that every judgment about the public good is rendered
from a vantage point which the person making the judgment
occupies but others-whose social class, tastes, personal history
S PAUL RICOEUR, FREUD 32 (1970).
4 Martin Heidegger, The Age of the World Picture, in THE QUESTION CONCERNING
TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 115 (1977).
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and form of life are different-do not. We have grown used to
translating every statement of the form, "the public good
requires thus and such," into a perspectival claim: "the public
good, as so-and-so conceives it from his point of view, requires
thus and such." The public good is by definition something
common, something different people share, but perspectives
are not: they vary from one person to the next and indeed, in
the end, are unique. No two people share exactly the same
outlook on life. In this sense, a person's perspective is private;
it is something that belongs to him alone. Because all judg-
ments about the public good are perspectival, it is therefore
tempting to infer that they are all essentially private in nature,
that every claim about the public good is just the statement in
misleadingly common-that is to say, objective-terms of a
private point of view. Those who draw this inference are likely
to conclude that appeals to the public good are not at all what
they seem, and that arguments about its meaning are really
just conflicts between private perspectives in disguise. Along
with the habits of suspicion that Marx, Freud and Nietzsche
have taught us, the increasingly radical forms of perspectivism
that have gained intellectual currency in recent years make the
distinction between public good and private interest, which
once seemed so clear, murkier and harder to defend, and by
doing so throw in doubt the understanding of civility on which
the republican tradition of political thought was based.
There are answers to these doubts, however, that deprive
them of much of their sting. First, as to perspectivism, one
may respond that even if every claim about the public good is
a claim from a private point of view, this does not itself make
the claim in question a claim about the point of view from
which it issues. The claim itself may be shaped-deeply
shaped-by the private experiences, attitudes, and preferences
of the person making it, but it does not refer to these shaping
influences themselves. What it refers to is the public good: that
is what philosophers call its intentional object, the thing the
claim purports to be a claim about. Of course, a person may
also make a statement about how things appear to him, from
his own private point of view. In that case, it is his perspective
and not some state of affairs that he believes to be indepen-
dent of this perspective (such as the public good) to which his
statement refers-that forms the intentional object of his
statement. These claims have different objects, they refer to
different things, and hence have different meanings: they
convey different thoughts and are interpreted differently by
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those to whom they are addressed. If the distinction between
public good and private perspective is entirely erased, this
difference of meaning disappears, and the sense of these
claims is lost: they become, strictly speaking, unintelligible.
Hence even if every judgment about the public good is a
judgment from a private point ofview, the distinction between
public good and private perspective is needed to make sense
of these judgments themselves, whose perspectival character
therefore cannot be a reason for collapsing this distinction or
denying its existence. In Kantian terms, acceptance of the
distinction is a condition necessary for the possibility of
rendering perspectival judgments about the public good
intelligible at all.
Something similar may be said about the techniques of
suspicion, which encourage us to view public-spirited state-
ments regarding the common good as expressions of private
interest of an economic or psychological kind. Do not be
misled by the appearance of public-spiritedness, the practitio-
ners of these methods all say; appeals to the common good
are really just devices for the satisfaction of some antecedent
private need-the need to protect one's property, or power or
ego. But even if we assume that appeals of this sort all serve a
private interest of some kind, the very fact that they do shows
that the notion of the common good has value for some-
one-for the person making the appeal, in some cases, and
for those to whom the appeal is addressed in others. For if this
notion had no value for anyone at all, appeals to it could serve
no interest even of the most private and self-centered sort. To
put it crudely: if I want to persuade you to do something
because it will benefit me, I must appeal to the things you care
about; hence if, along with other considerations of a purely
self-interested kind, I appeal to some notion of the common
good, this itself suggests that you care about the common
good, to some degree at least. Even if we regard such appeals,
therefore, with a maximum of suspicion, and always begin by
asking what private interest they conceal, it is impossible to
understand their structure without assuming the very thing
that a strategy of perfect suspicion appears to deny, namely, an
interest in the public good. Thus here, too, the distinction
between private interest and public-spiritedness is needed to
understand the meaning of human words and actions even on
a view of them that seeks to reduce the second to the first. It
remains a condition of their intelligibility, which is just a more
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abstract (Kantian) way of restating La Rochefoucauld's famous
observation that "hypocrisy is the tribute vice pays to virtue."5
The distinction between private interest and public good
thus survives both the philosophies of suspicion and the
perspectivist arguments that together have done so much to
discredit this distinction and the traditional concept of civility
founded upon it. But the most serious challenge to this
concept comes not from these quarters, but from a novel
theory of politics, first presented in a systematic way by
Thomas Hobbes, which denies that civility is a condition of
government and thus makes it irrelevant to the problems of
political life. Hobbes did not attempt to show that public-
spiritedness is impossible (in the way, for example, that certain
extreme forms of perspectivism suggest). "What he sought to
show is merely that it is unnecessary to the establishment of
government, which can and will exist whether or not any of
those living under it are public-spirited in the sense of being
prepared to put the welfare of their political communities
before their own. According to Hobbes, the institutions of
government are best thought of as the outcome of a real or
imagined agreement whose main function is to pacifY the
world so that its human inhabitants can continue to pursue, in
peace and safety, the various activities in which they are
already (that is, pre-politically) engaged. Politics, on Hobbes'
view, has instrumental value only. It is not an arena of self-
fulfillment in which essential human powers are developed
and deployed, to the enjoyment of those who possess them; it
is not, as Aristotle claimed, a source of intrinsic satisfaction in
a complete human life. Nor, even more importantly, does the
realm of politics depend for its existence on the public-
spiritedness-the civility-of the citizens that occupy it, again,
as Aristotle argued. Aristotle said that a city can survive only if
a significant number of its citizens are prepared to sacrifice
themselves on its behalf. Hobbes insists, by contrast, that
governments are held together by self-interest, not patriotic
love. He argues that governments are formed and maintained
by individuals looking to their own welfare alone, and that no
other motive is required to produce the habits of loyalty and
law-abidingness in which the cohesion of government consists.
On this Hobbesian view of politics, civility is not inconceivable,
5 FRANCOIS, DUE DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, MAxIMES No. 218 (1678), quoted in THE
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 410 (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 1992).
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it is merely irrelevant. By severing the connection between
public-spiritedness, on the one hand, and the existence of the
public realm on the other, Hobbes reduces civility to a
common level with other private pursuits and transforms it, we
might say, into a hobby.
Republican thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries recognized in Hobbes' contractarian theory of
government a grave threat to their own conception of public
life. Against Hobbes' demotion of civility-his claim that
public-spiritedness is unnecessary to the establishment of civil
order-they continued to insist that it is necessary, and that
any political regime unsupported by civility is bound to
become corrupt and unstable. Ifself-interest is the only motive
citizens possess, they argued, the temptation to exploit the
laws and other institutions of government for private advan-
tage will be irresistible and no scheme of detection and
punishment can be devised that will make the public order
invulnerable to such exploitation, to corruption by those
seeking to bend and manipulate the laws for private gain. The
inevitable result of universal self-interest, they said, is thus the
destruction of government itself, as more and more people
rush to exploit it or to protect themselves against the depreda-
tions of others-the only sure protection against the corrup-
tion and instability of government being, on a republican view
of things, a sufficient degree of public-spiritedness among
governors and governed alike. This view lay at the heart of the
Old Whig conception of good government that played such an
important role in the English politics of the late eighteenth
century and that deeply influenced the outlook of our own
American framers.
The republican response to Hobbesianism consisted first,
therefore, in a denial of the factual validity of Hobbes' claim
that civic order can be maintained without civility. But the
republican counterattack had a second and even more
important objective, though one that was less often expressed:
to restore the dignity and importance of civility itself, which
Hobbes had reduced to a hobby, to an activity gratifying to its
practitioners, perhaps, but unnecessary to the production of
any real or lasting good. The eighteenth century champions
of republicanism were men who loved politics, who possessed
a passion for political life and found in it deep personal
meaning, who understood instinctively the priority of values
implied by Machiavelli's famous statement that he loved the
city of Florence more than his own soul, and who were
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revolted by the trivializing view of civility that Hobbes ad-
vanced. For them, political life could never be a hobby, and
the energy of their opposition to Hobbesianism derived above
all else from their desire to see the passion for public action,
which they felt so keenly themselves, restored to its classical
grandeur.
It is obvious that some human beings feel this passion
intensely and that it is connected, for them, to the deepest
purposes of life. What is less clear is the source of their
passion and the reasons for its intensity. From whence do the
pleasures of citizenship spring and why are these pleasures, for
some at least, so strong? I have said that, on a classical view,
civility is a pleasure in its own right, an art whose exercise
yields intrinsic satisfaction to the person who possesses it. But
what exactly is this pleasure and how can we explain the
remarkable ferocity with which certain human beings pursue
it, sometimes to the exclusion of all else, including, as Machia-
velli says, the good of their own souls?
The pleasures of citizenship include, first, the pleasure of
being seen and making an impression on others, the pleasure
of fame. The wish to be seen and admired is a universal
human desire. According to Hannah Arendt, it is the root of
all political action, the passion that drives us out of the
darkness and anonymity of private life into the theatre of the
public space. But there is a second pleasure that political
action affords, different and deeper than this one: the
pleasure of being connected to, or of participating in, some-
thing enduring.
We are all mortal creatures, given only a limited time on
earth. We lack permanence, and this is our most basic and
telling deficiency; all of our other deficiencies are aspects or
products of this one. Hence what we long for most intensely,
Plato tells us in the Symposium, is the thing we most decisively
lack: endurance, immortality, a longevity beyond our span of
years. In every human soul, he says, there is a longing to be
joined with something more permanent than ourselves.
Toward the end of the Symposium, Socrates recounts a speech
he claims to have heard from the priestess Diotima, years
before when he was himself a young man.6 Among other
things, Diotima describes the different forms that the human
longing for permanence assumes. We all share this longing,
6 PLATO, SYMPOSIUM 201d-212b.
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she says, but different people pursue it in different ways. Some
people-the great majority of human beings-satisfy the
longing to endure beyond their deaths by leaving an image of
themselves behind in the form of children (a physical image,
but more importantly, a psychical image, descendants that
possess one's habits and values as well as physique). Others, by
contrast, pursue permanence through political activity, by
taking a part in the lives of their cities, which are not fated to
die in the same way that individual human beings are, and by
attempting to leave a mark of some sort on their laws and
institutions. Finally, Diotima says, some people, the smallest
number of all, satisfy the human longing for permanence
through the study of immortal truth, which lasts for-
ever-through philosophy, science and religion.
One might argue that in a balanced life there should be
room for all three of these pursuits, and that they are comple-
mentary rather than competitive. But Diotima suggests
something different. The three immortalizing activities she
describes must be ranked hierarchically, Diotima insists,
according to their ability to satisfy the desire that stimulates
them in the first place. Judged by this criterion, the first
(procreation) must be ranked lowest and the third (philoso-
phy, science and religion) highest, with politics somewhere in
between. Only the third, on Diotima's view, is truly capable of
satisfying the human longing for permanence because only it
connects us to something that not merely outlasts us but
endures forever. The most fulfilling life, according to Diotima,
is therefore a life devoted centrally, perhaps even exclusively,
to the pursuit of truth and in which family and political
attachments are sharply downgraded or ignored. This is not a
balanced way of life but one marked by a certain kind of
extremism instead (a way of life exemplified, many have
thought, by Socrates' own career). To have this best of all
possible lives, it is necessary that one actively resist the pull of
family and city, that one fight against the temptation to pursue
immortality in either of these other (defective and incom-
plete) ways. Thus, on Diotima's view, the three paths by which
human beings seek immortality not only differ in value or
worth, but compete with one another for our loyalty and
energy and support. They cannot, in the end, be harmonized
in a well-balanced life but are perpetually at war, pulling us in
different and inconsistent directions, as Machiavelli recognized
in one way when he placed the welfare of his city before that
of his soul, and E.M. Forster acknowledged in another when
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he remarked that if he had to choose between saving his
country and saving his friend, he hoped he would the courage
to save his friend.
Diotima (Socrates) is a partisan of the philosophical life.
In her threefold scheme, the life of politics occupies a middle
and hence subordinate place. For some, however, this middle
path has an irresistible appeal, and their longing to join
something lasting takes the form, above all else, of a love of
political action, a desire to participate in the art of civil
government, a public-spirited willingness to place the good of
their political communities above all other interests, including
their own individual welfare. These are the true lovers of
politics, and for them the claims of the political realm take
precedence over those of the family, on the one side, and of
philosophy, science and religion on the other. For them the
highest good, the one whose pursuit most fully satisfies their
yearning for permanence, is the good of the political commu-
nities to which they belong, and the greatest pleasure they
know is the pleasure of civility.
To a large degree, of course, the relative attraction that
each of Diotima's three paths holds for a given individual is a
matter of personal temperament, education and the like, and
hence of luck or chance. Still, the lovers of each are able to
make a case on its behalf. The case for the third path, for a
life devoted to the pursuit of immortal truth, is made by
Diotima herself with a simplicity and force that can never be
improved upon. The case for the life of politics is harder to
construct. It rests at bottom on two claims.
First, every cultural activity, even those of a nonpolitical
sort, can be carried on in a sustained way only within a
political community bound together by laws. In the absence of
such a community, in what Hobbes calls a state of nature,
there can be, as he observes, "no culture of the earth; no
navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported
by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving,
and removing, such things as require much force; no knowl-
edge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no
letters; no society."7 All these require the security of the laws
as a condition of their existence. The whole realm of human
culture is, in this sense, a political phenomenon, for it can
only come into being within a political setting-even those
7 THoMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 82 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1946).
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cultural activities that are unconcerned with politics itself.
_Philosophy, for example, aims at something beyond the realm
of politics and yet, as Socrates acknowledged, the activity of
philosophizing exists only in cities. Similarly, family life, in
anything but a biological sense, is impossible outside the
protective orbit ofthe laws. To the extent that relations among
family members are defined by the bonds of marriage,
inheritance and the like; that parents not only produce their
children but seek to educate them as well; and· that the
members of a family are able to create a collective identity for
themselves, enduring over many generations, the family is a
cultural institution whose existence depends (like that of every
other) on the establishment of political order, even though its
own aims are completely unpolitical in nature. Thus each of
the other immortalizing activities that Diotima describes-the
pursuit of truth and the rearing of children-is possible only
within the political space which the art of civil government
creates, so that this last activity, the second in Diotima's
scheme, may rightly be said to have at least an existential
priority over the other two. This is the first claim on which the
defense of the life of politics rests.
The second is that there is something distinctively human
about this life, and that its affirmation is, in a special way, an
affirmation of the human condition itself. The life of philoso-
phy may enable one to participate, if only fleetingly, in
something truly immortal (that is the reason Diotima gives for
judging it the best life of all), but the divine things that last
forever lie beyond the human realm, from which the practitio-
ners of philosophy detach themselves to live, intermittently at
least, the life of a god. The pleasures of philosophy are, in this
respect, inhuman. So, too, one might say, are the pleasures of
procreation, though in their case the enjoyment is less than
human, not more. Human procreation of course includes a
cultural component missing in the lives of other living things,
but its cultural features are all built upon, and woven around,
our animal sexuality. Aristotle tells us that every animal
achieves a measure of immortality by participating in the life
of its species through sexual reproduction, and though human
reproduction has a cultural dimension too, a large part of the
pleasure of parenthood consists in the animal joy of being
carried along in the endless current of birth and death that
constitutes the life of the species. This joy is intense, but other
animals share it, just as the gods share the intense joy of
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contemplation; in neither case is the pleasure distinctively
human.
The most distinctive human pleasure is that associated
with the intermediate activity oflawmaking, the art ofbuilding
cities, which-to invoke Aristotle once again-animals cannot
create and the gods do not require. To practice this art in a
loving way is thus to affirm the activity that most directly
embodies the human condition, suspended between the
spheres of animal and divine existence. The cities that men
and women build with the art of civil government rise up
above the metabolic routines of animal life. They show that
among the earth's creatures we alone have spiritual ambitions.·
But, like everything on earth, the cities that we build are liable
to decay; they rise and fall, and disappear from view. They are
touched by our own mortality, by the impermanence we share
with other earthly creatures. Nothing displays our composite
human nature more compellingly, therefore, than the realm
of politics, and the pleasure that a life of politics affords is the
pleasure of embracing our humanity on its own terms instead
of seeking release from it in something of a higher or lower
sort. This is a tragic pleasure because the human condition is
defined by an ambition for permanence that cannot be
fulfilled within the limits of human life, but only by escaping
these limits, in an upward or downward direction, into the
mindless eternity of animal existence or the eternity of
thought in which God presumably dwells. The life of politics
is thus a distinctively human life-the most human of the
three Diotima mentions-and the pleasure which the true
lover of politics finds in it is a tragic pleasure that is likely to
seem, to those who feel it intensely, the satisfaction most
suited to our impossible condition (which is perhaps why
Athens made tragedy its civic religion and why every anti-
humanistic thinker, from Plato on, has found the realm of
politics deficient).
This is the case for the life of politics, for civility, as the
best among the lives Diotima describes. In every society, a
small number of people will be passionately drawn to this life,
and find their deepest pleasures in it. And in every society,
some among the rest will periodically enter the political realm
for brief periods of time, while others never engage in public
life at all. For a few people, civility is a ruling passion, but for
most it is likely to be, at best, an intermittent one. For them,
the human longing to participate in something lasting, to be
connected to something that endures, is mainly satisfied by
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involvement in the lives of their families, on the one hand,
and by pursuit of eternal truth on the other (which, for most
people, takes the form of religious truth and its concomitant,
personal salvation). In the lives of this large group of people
(the majority by far), the longing for permanence is certainly
not absent. It merely assumes a non-political form, except on
those occasions when a public-spirited desire to take part in
the business of government for the sake of contributing to an
enterprise of lasting worth wells up, stimulated, perhaps, by a
private interest but eventually outgrowing it to become a
longing for the good of the community as a whole: the
longing that every true lover of politics feels. Most of the time,
however, most people are not true lovers of politics in this
sense and during the long intervals when their pursuit of
permanence takes other forms, their attitude toward the realm
of politics is likely to be an instrumental one only. The only
thing they are likely to want from politics, during these
periods, is the advancement of their interests (including, of
course, their interest in securing immortality by other means).
In contrast to the lover of politics, whose desire for connection
with something lasting is satisfied in political action itself,
these others view it merely as a tool for satisfying this same
desire in non-political ways, and after every episode of real
citizenship, in which they feel temporarily moved by the spirit
of the political realm, this is the instrumental view of it to
which they return.
Today, however, there is a diminishing appetite in our
country even for citizenship of this episodic kind. An increas-
ing number of Americans are incapable of being roused, even
for brief periods of time, out of their habit of viewing the
political sphere as anything but a forum for the advancement
of other, non-political interests of one kind or another, and
into seeing its issues in a genuinely public-spirited way. This
decrease in the appetite for citizenship is the real crisis of
civility in America today, and it correlates with an increasing
devotion to family and church, the two other (non-political)
institutions in which contemporary Americans act most
forcefully on their longing to be connected with something of
greater durability than themselves. Indeed, these two institu-
tions are now loosely joined under the banner of "family
values," a program that is partly familial and partly religious in
character. The program offamily values does not celebrate the
sovereignty of the individual or the transient pleasures of
material life; indeed, it is sharply opposed to these things.
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What it celebrates instead, in both its familial and religious
aspects, is the pleasure of belonging to something larger and
more permanent than oneself. But it disjoins this pleasure
from the realm of politics, which it treats in a strictly instru-
mental fashion as a tool for promoting the two other paths by
which human beings seek a sense of permanence in their lives.
The longing for permanence is universal. It takes different
forms, however, and these compete for our allegiance. In most
people's lives, it takes the form of true civility, of a public-
spirited devotion to the good of the political realm for its own
sake, only occasionally and for limited periods of time. But in
recent years, even this limited love of politics has sharply
decreased among us, as our energies and loyalties have shifted
to other, non-political forms of self-immortalization. The loss
of civility in America that so many descry does not consist in
an increase of rudeness, vulgarity and the like. It consists in
this loss of political appetite, in a diminishment of the love of
political action for its own sake, that Diotima identifies as the
middle path to immortality and which, until quite recently,
had at least an occasional grip on the American people but
today grows steadily weaker as its competitors, joined under
the flag of family values, gain in strength.
Several different developments have contributed to the
decline of civility in this sense. One, perhaps the most
important, is the disappearance from American politics of
issues of transcendent importance, of issues that make it plain
to everyone involved that political action is not simply about
the pursuit of private interest but values of enduring signifi-
cance too, values that touch the country's deepest and most
lasting aspirations, so that in taking a stand on these issues
One is participating in a public venture of real permanence
and notjust the transient, kaleidoscopic competition ofprivate
claims. In the postwar period, two issues of this sort stood out
above all others. The first was the battle against communism,
a commitment, on our part, of world historical significance,
that guided and gave transcendent meaning to our entire
foreign policy over a forty year period; and the second was the
civil rights movement, which conferred on many aspects of
domestic policy (desegregation, the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
the War on Poverty, and so on) a similar sense of connection
to enduring values, anchored in the bedrock of the republic,
that rose above the constantly changing scene of everyday
interests to something more permanent. But the battle against
communism is now over, and the only orienting principle that
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has been offered to replace it is some still-undefined notion of
vital national interests, which hardly possesses the grandeur
and permanence of our earlier fight against what Reinhold
Neibuhr called "a demonic religio-political creed,"8 and
Ronald Reagan described as the "evil empire." And, so far as
the civil rights movement is concerned, what began as a great
moral crusade of enduring significance has now degenerated,
in many people's view of it, into a contest of private interests,
a change that occurred as the movement shifted from its
original emphasis on rights to a concern with remedies, in the
form of busing, affirmative action and the like. The fight
against communism and the civil rights movement both drew
inspiration, of course, from religious sources, from values
beyond the realm of politics. But each was, at its heart, a
political movement aimed at creating (or preserving) a certain
form of public life, not just for instrumental reasons but also
for its own sake, as something good in itself.-in sharp
contrast, for example, to Pat Robertson's Christian Coalition,
whose political interventions are strictly strategic. Together
these two campaigns gave American politics in the postwar
period a connection to something more permanent than the
ceaseless conflict of private claims, and their disappearance
has created a vacuum in which it is harder to satisfy the
longing for such a connection through political action. Even
the debate over the budget, which at first seemed responsive
to this longing, has now degenerated into a contest of interests
in which nothing of transcendent value is at stake. As a result,
the desire for a connection to something permanent, no
longer finding opportunities for fulfillment in the realm of
politics, today seeks satisfaction in the non-political spheres of
family and church instead.
The transformation of the American party system, through
well-meaning but misguided reforms, has also contributed to
the weakening of our appetite for political action in any but
an instrument sense. Our two parties of course represent
various interest group constituencies, which view them as
means for the advancement of their own social and economic
programs. To some extent, however, our political parties have
always also been vehicles of public-spirited concern, and from
time to time this has been their primary function. But the
latter dimension of party politics-its public-spirited dimen-
8 REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE IRONY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 3 (1952).
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sion-has weakened considerably in recent years. The Demo-
cratic Party no longer has a guiding vision of any kind to
which it can appeal as a ground for support beyond its
traditional constituencies, and the Republican vision is largely
the product of a dogmatic religious fundamentalism which its
proponents show no desire to expand into a more ecumenical
political morality that large numbers of Americans outside
their ranks might endorse. As a result, many now believe that
both parties have been captured by narrow factional interests
and that any broad based public-spirited movement must
begin outside the structure of our present two party system.
Ironically, this state of affairs has been hastened by reforms in
party organization undertaken a quarter century ago to make
the selection of presidential candidates more open and
democratic-less manipulable by party potentates brokering
deals in smoke-filled rooms at their national conventions-but
which has actually strengthened the hold that well-organized
interest groups have on party politics by giving primary
elections a determining influence that all but eliminates real
deliberative opportunities for the formulation, at the national
level, of party programs that rise above narrow interest group
concerns and for the selection of candidates sufficiently
independent to defend such programs in a convincing way.
Those who under other circumstances might be drawn into a
public-spirited campaign for the common good are therefore
likely to find their appetite for civility thwarted by the limited
opportunities that party politics today affords, and so long as
the barriers to organizing a third party remain high, the desire
for connection to something lasting, which their appetite for
civility expresses, will flow in other, non-political directions.
The growing commercialization of the legal profession has
been a third factor contributing to the decline of civility in
America. Lawyers have always played a large role in our public
life, and the love of politics has always been particularly strong
among them. Those with an appetite for politics have general-
ly been drawn to the law as a career and, more than other
pursuits, the practice of law itself stimulates a passion for
political action. But the practice of law, especially in the upper
reaches of the bar, has in the last twenty years become an
almost purely commercial activity that offers fewer and fewer
opportunities for the expression of public-spiritedness, on a
scale large or small, and decreasing encouragement to its
cultivation in the first place. Lovers of politics in the past
found in the profession of law a vocation well-matched to their
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desires: a setting in which to satisfy their love of public life,
and to act the part of citizen even in their private dealings
with clients. But the opportunities to do this are decreasing
and the incentives lawyers face (both material and honorific)
now all run in the opposite direction. Today, in fact, the
passion for public life is more likely to be thwarted than
gratified in the practice of law, and the obstruction of this
important vocational outlet for the spirit of civility is one more
reason why the desire that drives it now seeks satisfaction in
the non-political realms of family and church instead.
Finally, one might speculate about the impact on civility
of television, the most powerful cultural force in the world
today. In a recent and widely-discussed series of empirical
studies, the Harvard sociologist Robert Putnam has persuasive-
ly documented a decline in the frequency with which Ameri-
cans join groups and organizations of all sorts. (His essay
"Bowling Alone", for example, describes a sharp decrease in
the percentage of bowlers who bowl in leagues rather than by
themselves.) 9 This decline in group participation is an age-
related phenomenon, according to Putnam. Those born after
World War II, who grew up in the 1950s, show a markedly
lower tendency to join groups of any kind than their parents
and grandparents, who came of age during the first half of the
century. This is an interesting datum in its own right, but what
is even more revealing is the fact that, among those in the
post-War generation, the rate of group participation is most
strongly correlated (among the variables Putnam tested) with
television viewing: the more you watch television, Putnam's
studies show, the less likely you are to participate in organized
group activities outside the home. Newspaper readers, on the
whole, show a higher rate of participation than television
watchers, and "light" television watchers a higher rate than
"heavy" consumers (those who spend more time each week in
front of the set).
This is only a correlation, of course, but there are plausi-
ble reasons for thinking that the relationship has some causal
significance too. First, and most importantly, television in this
country is overwhelmingly commercial, which means that most
shows, no matter how thoughtful or public-spirited, are
9 Robert D. Pumam, BowlingAlone: AmericasDeclining Social Capital, 6J. OF DEMOCRACY
65 (1995).
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interrupted every fIfteen minutes or so by a commercial
message whose aim is to remind the viewer of some unsatisfIed
material (and often bodily) need. The effect of these messages
is to jolt the viewer out of whatever other-directed reverie he
or she may briefly have been lost in, and back to the realm of
need, which is self-centered by its nature. Viewers of television
are never permitted, for very long, to think about anything but
themselves, and this constant and unremitting insistence on
the primacy of personal needs encourages a kind of autism
that destroys the spirit ofselflessness on which, to some degree
at least, all group activities depend. (In this respect, newspaper
reading encourages very different habits, for although newspa-
pers contain commercial advertisements, these are not set into
the text of articles themselves and do not force the reader to
interrupt his reading in the way that television commercials
force viewers to interrupt their watching, even those whose
remote controls permit them to mute their sets until the
program resumes.)
Second (driven largely, perhaps, by the need for frequent
commercial interruptions), most television shows are divided
into brief, self-contained episodes that must have a dramatic
completeness of no more than a few minutes duration. Even
public television shows are often divided in this way into brief
units of meaning, as anyone who has ever watched more than
a few minutes of "Sesame Street" can attest. The fragmented,
episodic skits on "Sesame Street" are in fact a perfect prepara-
tion for the fIve minute dramas of MTV, which are in tum a
preparation for the sound-bite culture of the evening news. At
every stage along the way, from childhood to adolescence to
adulthood, television habituates the viewer to expect that
meaningful messages can be delivered in a few minutes time
and weakens the capacity to absorb messages of a longer and
more complex kind-that is, it shortens the viewer's attention
span. Again, the contrast with reading is obvious and the effect
on political action predictably negative, for unlike bodily
needs, which require no deliberation (and therefore no time)
to discover, the meaning of the public good is always a subject
of deliberative debate that takes time and hence demands of
its participants an attention span longer and calmer than the
one television watching produces (not to mention a degree of
activity which the hypnotic passivity of television profoundly
discourages) .
It is thus reasonable to think that an increase in television
viewing causes a decline in civility, and that Americans'
HeinOnline -- 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 747 1995-1996
1996] DISTINGUISHED LECTURER SERIES-KRONMAN 747
appetite for public action has decreased because the number
of hours they spend watching television has gone up. To the
other reasons for the loss of civility in America, this one must
therefore be added. But it is important to remember that what
Putnam's studies show is a decline not merely in the frequency
with which Americans join political groups but the frequency
with which they join groups of any kind at all-social and
religious as well as political-and in this more general
phenomenon lies a clue, perhaps, to a crisis even deeper that
the crisis of civility that has been my subject here. For what is
perhaps most remarkable about the period in which we now
find ourselves is the weakening of the desire for permanence
not only in the realm of politics but across the full range of
human pursuits. However you measure it, for example, family
stability is on the decline, and though religious feeling may
seem to be increasing, much of it now finds expression in
movements, like the Promise Keepers and the Million Man
March, that are likely, after a brief existence, to disappear and
leave no lasting organizational or spiritual residue behind.
What one sees today, in each of the spheres that Diotima
describes, is a slackening of the appetite for permanence, of
the desire to be joined, through procreation or citizenship or
the worship of God, to something more lasting than one's self.
Each of these modes of immortalization requires the individu-
al to go out of himself and submit to something else. Each
might be described, therefore, as a form of sacrifice, whose
aim is to secure a life beyond the limits our own mortality
imposes, and the general failure of the appetite for perma-
nence that defines our world today is characterized by the
dominance of an attitude of exactly the opposite kind, an
attitude of self-absorption rather than self-sacrifice, which
tends, at its limit, toward the momentary and fragmented
existence of a creature given over entirely to the satisfaction
of its bodily appetites and uninterested in establishing a link
to anything of greater durability beyond the circle of its own
transient needs: the existence of a television watching couch
potato who no longer feels an interest in joining any group at
all, who bowls alone wherever he goes, whose passion for
immortality-in any place, at any time, of any form-is dead.
But how can this be? The human desire for immortality
springs from our greatest deficiency and the longing to repair
it. It is a part of human nature. If human nature has not
changed-if we are still the same sort of creature that Diotima
described-how can the passion for immortality be dying
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among us (a death of which the death of civility is merely an
aspect)? Perhaps the answer lies in the transience of our
civilization.
The plain fact is that our civilization cannot continue in
its present form. The earth's endowment of fossil fuels will
soon be spent, and when it is, another form oflife, unimagin-
ably different from our own, must arise to replace it. We all
know this and feel it every day at some unacknowledged level
of perception, whenever we drive a car, or turn on a comput-
er, or telephone a friend. The world that we inhabit wears the
sign of doom on its brow, and we all know this in our hearts.
"Abraham, or some old peasant of the past," Max Weber
writes, "died 'old and satiated with life' because he stood in
the organic cycle of life."lo Life for Abraham had meaning
because it was connected to a world he knew to be enduring.
He lived every day of his life in the knowledge that the world
would always be as it was that day, and had been in the past.
Even fifty years ago, most of mankind lived in this knowledge.
But for us it is no longer possible to believe in good faith that
our world will endure. We know that it is transient and must
pass away-a knowledge that is the last fine fruit of those
discoveries that transformed the earth itself, and the stars
above, from the "visible eternal" that Aristotle saw into wasting
assets spoiled, in Rilke's words, by the "flicker" of time;ll and
that is intensified by the rapidity with which the circumstances
of everyday life are today changing for the majority of human
beings, a pace of change that assures, as George Kennan
somewhere observes, that most people now die in a world
radically different from the one into which they were born.
Our civilization is the most materially comfortable the
world has ever known, but it is also the least permanent, and
the awareness that this is so must cause in the souls of
ordinary human beings a deep and anxious doubt about the
meaning of their lives which depends, in the end, on the
possibility of their participation in something more lasting
than themselves. If we knew how to restore some measure of
permanence to our world, these doubts might again resume
their familiar dimensions. But we do not know how to do this,
for the human world today appears to those who inhabit its
10 Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAx WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 140
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eels., 1958).
II Rainer Maria Rilke, Aus tern Nachlass tes Graten C. W, First Series, Poem X.
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most advanced regions to be driven by forces beyond our
control, and since we are unable to make the world more
permanent, what we have done instead is to conceal from
ourselves the anxiety that its transience stirs in our souls. We
have done this by suppressing the longing for permanence
itself, through a narcotized consumerism that draws the
boundaries of the world to coincide with those of our bodily
needs and that leaves each of us wrapped in a separate
cocoon, rocking back and forth between appetite and satisfac-
tion, uninterested in connecting to anything beyond the magic
circle of the self.-the state of the soul that Putnam's studies
describe.
We have done this but I do not think-I cannot be-
lieve-that we shall ever succeed entirely, for our longing to
be joined with something that endures is irrepressible and all
our efforts to destroy this longing only point to its immense,
frustrated power. One day, some day, the world will change
even ifwe are not the ones who change it, and the longing for
permanence, which is as old as the human soul, will once
again find in the world a hopeful measure of endurance. Then
this longing will emerge out of its unhappy suppression and all
the old ways of pursuing immortality that Diotima describes
will once again revive, including the love of public life that
constitutes the true heart of civility. For the love of politics,
like the love of children and God, may be discouraged and
suppressed but it can never truly be lost.
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